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 e Federal Reserve cut the federal funds rate.  is shi ed many
interest rates down (not the mortgage rate though). Cutting the federal
funds rate is o en, but not always, a path to lower interest rates. It was
this time. Lower interest rates are a common way that stock prices rise. It
seems the market responded to the cut, at least to this point.
 e interest rate story about our economic future reversed. From the
end of May until October 15, longer-term rates were lower than the
short-term rates.  is is called an “inverted yield curve.” It is a common
sign that the market expects a recession since lower interest rates o en
indicate lower economic activity. But then, magically, the longer rates
went higher than the shorter and remain there. It seems stocks
On November 4, the stock market hit a record level.  e returns were 12.4
percent from November 4, 2018, to November 4, 2019.  is is an above
average return (the average is about 7 percent). Our forecast last year was that
the market would increase “below average,” so we were wrong.
But from November 4, 2018, to October 9, 2019 (233 days), the returns were
6.6 percent, so we were really on track most of the year. But then the market
proved us wrong by adding $1.5 trillion to the wealth of Americans in 18
days. Given the whipsaw of economic news reports, if we just wait for the
right moment to measure annual returns, we can make  nancial market
forecasts great again.
We think what happened over those 18 days is indicative of what will happen
in 2020. Let’s review:
responded to the forecast by moving up (or maybe the reverse
happened?).
 e perpetual trade war seems to be petering out.  e trade de cit
with China fell 3 percent in September, and for the moment the two
sides appear to be closing in on a deal.  e U.S. trade de cit fell in
September.
Still, economic growth is anemic and the U.S. trade de cit is 13 percent
higher than when Trump took office.  e great economic question of the
Trump administration is how much faster the economy would be growing
without the damage of his trade protectionism.  e recent report of
lackluster 1.9 percent growth in the third quarter shows again that you can’t
escape Adam Smith’s revenge for indulging in bad economic policy stemming
from political goals.
 e economy continued to grow as consumer spending provided nearly all of
the growth in GDP. For the second quarter in a row, the mighty consumer
had to offset falling business investment to produce positive growth.
 e last two quarters of business investment have been negative a er nearly
two years of healthy gains that had revived with the Trump presidency and
the recharging of business animal spirits. Early on in the administration, the
Trump policy mix of tax reform and deregulation clearly made a difference to
investment and growth. Investment accelerated in 2017 a er falling in the
Obama administration. Estimates are that U.S. companies repatriated nearly
$1 trillion from overseas since tax reform passed.
Europe hasn’t grown fast for decades, and its 2017 growth bump was
helped by faster U.S. growth.
Businesses were not starving for money even before the Fed began
cutting rates again this summer.
GDP growth accelerated to 3 percent for a time in 2017-2018 along with
investment, but then came Trump’s entirely discretionary trade intervention.
More than the damage from tariffs, the uncertainty of what Mr. Trump might
do next caused business con dence to fall.  is has led to increases in hurdle
rates for capital projects across the board, thus slowing capital investment,
ultimately yielding slower output that is re ected in roughly 2 percent GDP
growth in the last two quarters.
 e economy is now down again to the slow Obama growth plane.
President Trump and some in the White House blame the Federal Reserve
and Europe for this slump, but neither explanation holds up.
 e strong evidence is that trade policy is the main growth culprit. Basically
driving downhill with the brakes applied, U.S. manufacturing has slumped,
which is related to slowing exports. Slower growth in China from the trade
war has reduced the exports of U.S. farm, industrial and construction
equipment.  e third-quarter decline in spending for information processing
equipment, much of which is exported, was the largest in seven years.
A study by Federal Reserve economists this year looked at two waves of trade
policy “shock,”  rst in 2018 and then in the  rst half of 2019, and estimated
that the impact reduced GDP growth by about 1 percentage point. In the
National Association for Business Economics October survey, 53 percent
cited trade policy as the key downside economic risk through 2020.
In October, the Fed continued trying to counter that risk by cutting the
federal funds rate for the third time this year—for a total of 75 basis points—
to between 1.5 percent and 1.75 percent. With in ation at about 1.7 percent,
this means that the real interest rate for banks is negative, even with the
economy growing 2 percent and the jobless rate at a historic low of 3.5
percent.  is is not tight policy.  e White House is just wrong about the
Fed, which is doing what it can to countervail the ill effects of the risky trade
policies led by Trump.
Fed Chairman Jay Powell said at his news conference that the rate cuts are
already showing up in a stronger housing market. And housing in the third
quarter contributed to GDP growth for the  rst time in seven quarters. But
housing is a form of consumption and doesn’t drive the productivity gains
and higher wages that other business investment does.  e Fed will have to
watch not to repeat the excesses in housing and other non-production assets
of the 2000s that eventually came to grief.
 e larger point is that monetary policy can’t make up for bad
macroeconomic decisions. Zero rates couldn’t li  the economy above 2
percent in the Obama years when regulation and high tax rates undermined
business con dence and investment. Negative rates are no panacea for trade
shocks either.
With this as a background, we turn to fundamentals, which we hope may be
great again soon. Stock prices are determined by the future streams of cash
 ows—driven by earnings—and the valuation of these cash  ows, which is
the present value using a set of discount rates that re ect risk. Typically, this
is summarized by earning forecasts and a valuation ratio—the P/E ratio. We
call these “fundamentals.”
Earnings growth: Analysts are forecasting earnings will increase 9.8
percent in 2020 for the S&P 500. Energy is predicted to grow 25.2
percent. Financials is expected to be the worst sector with a 4.8 percent
growth. Sectors with above-average expected earnings are energy,
industrials, materials and consumer discretion.
Revenue growth: Revenues for the S&P 500 are expected to rise 5.3
percent in 2020.  e best sector, communication services, is expected to
rise 9.1 percent, while the worst sector,  nancials, is predicted to rise 1.9
percent.
Year-over-year revenue growth:  is is a positive 3.1 percent for the S&P
500 from third quarter 2018 to third quarter 2019, led by health care.
Quarter 3 earnings and revenue “beats”: Of the 355 companies in the S&P
500 that have reported for the third quarter of 2019, 76 percent have
reported earnings above the mean estimate of analysts (higher than the
historical average of 69 percent) and 61 percent have reported revenues
above the mean estimate (below the historical average of 66 percent).
IPOs:  ere have been 140 IPOs (as of October 15) that raised $43
billion.  is is down 4 percent over this time last year, but much larger
than 2016-2017.  e biggest sector was technology, where Uber raised
$8.1 billion and Slack raised $7.3 billion (but we also had the disaster of
WeWork).
Fundamentals
 e positive fundamental factors for stock returns in 2020 are:
 e negative fundamental factors for stock returns in 2020 are:
Year-over-year earnings decline: From third quarter 2018 to third quarter
2019, earnings declined 2.7 percent for the S&P 500. S&P 500 companies
with more international exposure have the largest declines. For those
with over 50 percent of their revenue outside the U.S., the earnings
decline is -7.6 percent.
International exposure leading to greater risk: 38 percent of revenue for
S&P 500  rms are international: Information technology is 57 percent,
materials is 54 percent, consumer staples is 45 percent, and energy is 41
percent.
Six sectors are showing a year-over-year decline, led by energy, materials
and information technology. Five sectors are showing a year-over-year
increase, led by health care and utilities.
Companies are guiding earnings downward for the fourth quarter, and
analysts are expecting year-over-year to be negative. 2019 earnings will
quite likely be lower than 2018.
 e market is rewarding positive surprises more than average, but also
punishing negative earnings surprises more than average (2 percent more
for positive, -2 percent more than average for negative).  is results in an
increase in volatility, presenting another drag on valuations.
Forward P/E ratios are high. As of November 4, 2019, the 12-month
forward P/E ratio for the S&P 500 was 17.2. ( is is current price
divided by forecasted earnings. Multpl.com shows the current S&P 500
P/E ratio at 22.1.)  e P/E ratio is above both the  ve-year average
(16.6) and also the 10-year average (14.9).
 e Schiller cyclically adjusted P/E ratio (CAPE) is currently at 29.0,
which is near one of its highest measurements, the other two occurring
in (a) 1929 just prior to “Black Tuesday” when the Schiller measure was
also about 30, and (b) in the latter part of 1999, just prior to the dot.com
crash. In 2020, we expect most companies to continue to produce
positive earnings over the coming year, which should help bring the
Schiller P/E ratio measure for the market back into line. But there is little
room for valuation to grow without improved earnings in 2020.
Stock repurchases over dividends. Analysts estimate stock buybacks
within  rms of the S&P 500 to total about $710 billion. Goldman Sachs
forecasts that buybacks will fall 5 percent. Share repurchases have been a
key short-term driver but in the medium term, this may be positive.
Opting to repurchase shares rather than electing to invest in new projects
is negative.
Volatility levels:  e VIX index measures volatility in the market by
looking at S&P 500 options prices. It was  at and low in 2017, but has
been high and volatile in 2018 and 2019—especially in October.
Budget de cits:  e projected budget de cit for 2019 by the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) is $960 billion.  is means that
federal expenditures were $960 billion more than federal revenue.  e
de cit is about 4.5 percent of GDP, up from 3.9 percent of GDP in 2018.
U.S. debt:  e de cit has caused the largest expansion of federal debt
since World War II.  e total debt (held by the public) is $16.7 trillion,
which is 79 percent of GDP.  is ratio was 76 percent in 2018 and is
expected to grow to 88 percent in  ve years with trillion dollar de cits
starting next year. In  ve years, the CBO forecasts that the interest paid
on federal debt will be larger than the defense budget. If interest rates
rise to their historical average levels, the budgetary impact will be
dramatic. Increasing the average rate by 1 percent will trigger an
additional $140 billion in federal spending. Given lackluster output
growth to compensate for more interest payments, higher rates will
require reduced spending in other areas, increased taxes or both.
Public debt is NOT increasing interest rates:  e growth in federal debt
should put upward pressure on interest rates, but there are plenty of
lenders even at these low rates. (Germany has been issuing government
debt with negative interest rates—not negative real rates, but negative
stated rates.)
 e U.S. still faces a huge funding de cit in Social Security and Medicare
payments.  e present value shortfall is about $62 trillion.  is is
equivalent to $206,000 per person or $825,000 per U.S. household.  ese
problems are not insurmountable, but they do require common sense
and bipartisan leadership—something that appears to be in short supply
in Washington, D.C.
International risks:  e International Monetary Fund (IMF) says that
“the pace of the global economy remains weak.” Momentum in
manufacturing has weakened substantially to levels near the 2008
 nancial crisis. Rising trade and geopolitical tensions channel increased
uncertainty about the future of global cooperation (surprise, surprise).
China’s economy has slowed to below 7 percent, and the U.S. is actively
engaged in international trade negotiations, including changes to tariff
policies. It is not clear how these negotiations will end up, or what effect
they will have on continued international trade, on U.S. companies and
on the consumer marketplace. While it is conceivable the U.S. could
ultimately gain trading advantages with certain countries and yield
improved positioning overall in the longer term, downside risk is evident
in both the short term and longer term.
Forecast
Looking forward to 2020, the positives may just outweigh the negatives for
the market.  e economy is anemic, and we think GDP growth will be about
2 percent in 2020 with in ation around 1.7 percent. Earnings are weak and
likely to stay weak until business con dence is restored. Valuation is on the
high side and is unlikely to move signi cantly higher. While the forecast is for
small positive returns in the equities market, we also expect VIX to climb
higher given considerable downside risk to this forecast.
But the White House has a strong political incentive to resolve—or appear to
resolve—the trade problems they created. In this environment, we expect the
return to equities to be positive, but again below the 7 percent average return
over the past 50 years—and there is a signi cant chance of a negative return.
If the administration policies stabilize, P/E ratios may become great again
and the market could rise. Given the risks seen in Wall Street reports
available for investors to consider, we think that value stocks would
outperform growth stocks. We think that Treasury bonds will show small
increases beyond their current level, and we think there are material long-
term in ation risks that could make long-term bonds unattractive. Investors
should stick to short-term bonds to reduce their exposure to higher interest
rates.
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